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ABSTRACT
Running on Fumes: The Long and Short-Run Effects of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax
on Gasoline Consumption
Martin Long
Director: Mandie Weinandt
British Columbia (BC) implemented a carbon tax in 2008 at the rate of ten Canadian dollars
(CAD) per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e). In April of 2019, the tax was
set at a rate of CAD 40 per metric ton of CO2e with a dual mandate to reduce fuel
consumption while not contracting economic output. This paper attempts to estimate the
effect of British Columbia’s carbon tax on per capita gasoline consumption using panel
data regression. To assess the empirical evidence, provincial-level monthly data from ten
Canadian provinces was collected and analyzed over the period 1991 to 2018. Results from
this analysis suggest that a five-cent increase in the carbon tax was associated with a 5 to
9.3 percent reduction in gasoline consumption. In addition, the models indicated there to
be an amplified behavioral response to the tax in the years immediately following its
implementation. Evidence was also found suggesting the presence of carbon leakage,
however, the effect leakage had on the carbon tax’s effect could not be determined.

KEYWORDS: Carbon Tax, Carbon Leakage, Amplified Behavioral Response
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

With governments across the world recognizing the threat climate change poses to
their national security, policymakers have begun to embrace policy instruments geared
towards mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. The implementation of these instruments
has been difficult for a myriad of reasons. First, climate change poses a collective action
problem in which the economic disincentives of implementing climate policies tend to
outweigh cooperation. This is because climate policies provide a form of global public
good whose benefits are unconstrained by national boundaries but whose costs are
concentrated in the countries or regions cutting the carbon dioxide emissions (Rhodes and
Jaccard, 2013). Therefore, a country implementing stringent carbon-mitigating policies
will likely face greater costs than benefits, deterring the state’s willingness to act
unilaterally (Sandler, 1996). In addition, unilaterally enacted carbon-mitigating policies
such as carbon taxes provide the necessary conditions for carbon leakage (discussed in
Chapter 5) which can undermine the effectiveness of such policies by providing an
incentive for neighboring jurisdictions to uphold lax regulations.
Despite this free-rider problem, many countries and regions have launched
comprehensive policy instruments to meet aggressive greenhouse gas reduction goals.
Among these policy instruments, regulators have begun to champion two market-based
approaches: emissions trading systems (ETS) and carbon taxes. Currently, emissions
trading systems, or cap-and-trade programs, are the most prevalent carbon pricing approach
from an emissions coverage standpoint (Murray, 2015). This is largely a consequence of

1

the political advantages of cap-and-trade policies (Baldwin, 2008). Most notably, the less
visible nature of the costs to the consumer and the prospect of free allocation of permits to
industrial sources incite less electoral opposition (Harrison, 2010). In contrast, carbon taxes
necessitate a much clearer transfer of funds from individuals and firms to the government.
However, carbon taxes do offer several advantages over cap-and-trade policies. As outlined
by Kathryn Harrison (2010), carbon taxes are easier to implement, can be applied readily
to both large and small polluters, can spur business investment to develop and adopt lowcarbon technologies because of their price certainty, are more transparent with respect to
costs and distribution, and have the ability to produce a double-dividend of economic and
environmental benefits.
A carbon tax is a consistent price placed on each unit of carbon emissions.
Fortuitously, carbon emissions can be estimated with reasonable accuracy based on the
type and quantity of fossil fuel burned: one does not have to actually measure emissions.
It is thus possible to tax emissions by taxing different fuels proportionate to the amount of
carbon each fuel releases per unit of energy (Peet and Harrison, 2012). The objective of
carbon taxes is not to completely eradicate the consumption of fossil fuels. Rather, the tax
provides an incentive to firms and individuals to reduce their emissions until the cost of
abatement exceeds the tax, to which it then makes economic sense to pay the tax.
Opposition to carbon taxes is often grounded in arguments that the demand for fuels is
highly price inelastic and as a result, carbon taxes will have little effect on consumption
and emissions (Xiang & Lawley, 2019). Therefore, the impact carbon taxes have on
individuals and firms are a central feature in the current debates on carbon taxes.
Additionally, the social cost of emitting carbon dioxide is different for every individual
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which complicates the job of policymakers to construct the socially and economically
optimal carbon tax.
In terms of climate policy, Europe leads the word in the adoption of such policies.
In 1990, Finland became the first country to implement a carbon tax which was applied as
an excise duty on coal, natural gas, peat, and light and heavy fuel based on their carbon
content (Harrison, 2010). Other countries in Europe such as Poland, Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark followed suit and implemented their own carbon taxes in the next couple of years.
In 2005, the European Union introduced the first regional cap-and-trade program.
Consequently, many of the taxes in Europe work in tandem with an ETS, and as a result,
the direct effects of these taxes on emissions are difficult to calculate. In 2008, British
Columbia became the first entity outside of Europe to enact a carbon tax. Unlike the carbon
taxes of Europe, the BC carbon tax is an isolated emissions policy. Thus, having been in
place for over eleven years, BC provides an excellent case study to evaluate the
effectiveness of a carbon tax in attaining favorable environmental, economic, and political
outcomes.
This paper evaluates the carbon tax’s effectiveness in reaching its environmental
objective of reducing gasoline consumption. To do this, I quantified the carbon tax’s effect
on gasoline consumption by building off of the work of Rivers and Schaufele (2015). This
analysis adds seven years of relevant data to their analysis while also accounting for the
fact that gasoline consumption per capita started to decrease in 2004, but has been
increasing since 2012. As a consequence, I explored the possibility of there being an
amplified behavioral response to the BC carbon tax in the short-term. Using insights from
Eruktu and Hildebrand (2018), I add three years of relevant data to their analysis and
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control for potential confounding factors such as carbon leakage and advancements in
public transit. In addition, I controlled for increases in the carbon tax, whereas they
specified the carbon tax as a dummy variable.
To evaluate the effects of carbon leakage on gasoline consumption, this paper took
insights from Antweiler and Gulati’s (2016) analysis. Unlike Antweiler and Gulati (2016),
I controlled for the endogeneity of cross-border travel via a Canada-US gasoline price
differential variable. In addition, I added eleven years of pre-tax data and four years of
post-tax data while controlling for other emission mitigating policies, the business cycle,
and improvements in public transit to their analysis. This paper will proceed as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the political and economic factors which propelled the
carbon tax into existence. Chapter 3 identifies the key mechanics of the policy such as its
coverage, use of revenues, oversight, and collection process. Chapter 4 will review the
empirical research conducted on the tax’s effect on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions,
the distributional effects of the revenue-neutral tax, and its overall impact on the BC
economy. Chapter 5 will explore the literature on carbon leakage. Chapter 6 describes the
data and introduces the econometric models used to analyze the consumption of gasoline
in the province. Chapter 7 presents the results. Chapter 8 concludes and suggests future
policy implications.
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CHAPTER TWO
Origins of the Tax
In 2008, the Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) implemented the first
carbon tax on the North American continent. The tax was initially set at a level of 10
Canadian dollars (CAD) per metic ton of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) with annual
increases of CAD 5 until the tax reached CAD 30 in 2012. To place the carbon tax in
perspective, in July 2012, it contributed CAD 0.067 to the price of CAD 1.40 for a liter of
gasoline in Vancouver (Harrison, 2013), whereas other federal, provincial, and local taxes
contributed an additional CAD 0.40 (Natural Resources Canada, 2012). The tax remained
at CAD 30 until it was increased in 2018 to CAD 35. Currently, the tax stands at CAD 40
per ton of carbon dioxide equivalents (the tax’s annual increase was delayed due to
COVID-19) and will increase to CAD 50 per ton in 2021. Increasing the tax gradually was
a key feature of the policy’s design as it allowed individuals and firms time to adjust their
behaviors. Years after the carbon tax’s implementation, the public sentiment in British
Columbia towards the tax appears to be positive (Horne, 2012). For instance, a poll taken
in 2015 indicated 61% of British Columbians supported the carbon tax (Environics, 2015).
However, the tax has not always engendered such wide support from the electorate.
The British Columbia carbon tax was the product of a unique convergence of social,
political, and economic factors. Public concern over climate change had surged in Canada
and elsewhere during the first decade of the 21st century (Murray, 2015; Harrison, 2013;
Environics, 2015). In addition to this public concern, there were emerging expectations by
the global community to curtail greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, in order to fulfill
both the domestic and international community’s calls for action against global warming,
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the government of British Columbia passed the Greenhouse Gas Reductions Target Act in
2007. The legislation stipulated that British Columbia would reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 33 percent below 2007 levels by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050 (Climate
Action Plan, 2010). BC introduced numerous provincial climate policies in 2007 and 2008
but the carbon tax served as the key policy measure to achieve these goals (Beck, Rivers,
Yonezawa 2016; Harrison, 2013).
Against this backdrop, there were five factors present within the province of British
Columbia assisting in the implementation of this carbon tax. Harrison (2013) identifies
these five factors assisting in the tax’s passage: (1) BC’s unique position to draw on
hydropower resources to reduce its emissions, (2) increased voter interest in the issue of
climate change, (3) the existence of a right-of-center, self-proclaimed “free enterprise”
Liberal Party majority in government with support from the business community to pursue
this environmental agenda as businesses saw the carbon tax as a mechanism to share the
burden of meeting emissions targets with households, (4) unwavering personal
commitment from Premier Gordon Campbell, (5) the combination of a parliamentary
government and a single-member plurality electoral system which concentrates authority
in a small number of hands, most notably those of the leader of the party that holds a
majority of seats in the legislature, as was the case with Premier Campbell.
Despite these favorable conditions, passage and the subsequent survival of the
carbon tax was a challenging endeavor for Premier Campbell’s government.
Unsurprisingly, the environmental and academic communities were strongly in support for
this textbook carbon tax as evidenced by support in editorials in the province’s newspapers
(Mather, Olewiler, & Elgie, 2007; Jaccard, 2007; Harrison, 2012) and an open letter signed
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by 70 economics professors from BC’s major research universities (Green, 2007). To
capture the support of the business community, the tax was made revenue-neutral, meaning
the revenues from the tax would be redistributed to BC residents and businesses via tax
reductions and lump-sum payments (Murray, 2015; Harrison, 2013). Northern and rural
communities in British Columbia dissented against the passage of this carbon tax as they
perceived it to be unfair and discriminatory (Beck et al., 2016). Carbon tax opponents from
these communities offered three main arguments as to why the tax discriminated against
British Columbians who live and work in the north: (1) they live in a colder climate, (2)
they had to drive longer distances, (3) they didn’t have the same opportunities to reduce
their reliance on fossil fuels as southerners did because they did not have the luxury of
making urban lifestyle choices (Peet and Harrison, 2012). Despite analyses by academics
and the government which indicated rural residents would actually pay less on average than
residents of the urban south (Harrison, 2013; Beck et al., 2016), perceptions of unfairness
persisted, fueled by the historical political alienation of rural British Columbians (Peet and
Harrison, 2012).
Opposition to the carbon tax culminated in the 2009 provincial election viewed by some
as a referendum on the BC carbon tax (Murray, 2015). Widespread opposition to the carbon
tax had erupted in 2008 as the carbon tax took effect the same week the price of gasoline
reached its peak, pushing the price per liter over the symbolic CAD 1.50 mark in
Vancouver (Harrison, 2013). Even though the tax accounted for a mere 2.4 cents of the 40cent increase experienced by consumers in the spring of 2008, opposition amongst the
public towards the BC carbon tax soared (Harrison, 2013; Environics, 2011). The Liberals’
opposing governing party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), capitalized on the populist
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opposition and created the “Axe the Tax” campaign to repeal the tax (Harrison, 2013), even
though the party itself had called for a carbon tax only months before (NDP, 2007).
Ultimately, the global recession of 2008 saved the carbon tax as well as the governing
Liberal party’s majority as the electorate viewed the Liberal party as better qualified to
manage the economy (Harrison, 2013). Since 2009, the tax has experienced various other
threats, but the government’s reliance on tax revenues and a favorable public opinion has
ensured the survival of the tax.
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CHAPTER THREE
Mechanics of the BC Carbon Tax
The British Columbia carbon tax took effect on July 1st of 2008. In its original
design, the carbon tax had no exemptions and would apply to all greenhouse gasses emitted
by all fossil fuel combustion sources. Therefore, it would not include non-combustion
emissions from industrial processes (e.g., cement production) or in venting and fugitive
emissions from natural gas production and landfills (Harrison, 2013). Despite the original
intent of the carbon tax to not allow any exemptions, minor exemptions have been rolled
out over time. In 2012, the government granted greenhouse growers in BC a one-time,
CAD 7.6 million reprieve from the carbon tax (Rivers and Schaufele, 2015a). The
government then created a grant program for these growers which would cover 80% of the
carbon tax paid on natural gas and propane for heating and carbon dioxide production
(Rivers and Schaufele, 2015a). These exemptions were provided to greenhouse growers as
an attempt to enable them to compete with producers in the US and Mexico. Legislation
was also passed to exempt farmers from paying the carbon tax associated with diesel used
for farming purposes starting in 2014 (Rivers and Schaufele, 2015b). As a result of the
exemptions and non-combustion emission sources, the carbon tax covers roughly 70
percent of all greenhouse gas emissions in the province (British Columbia, 2019).
Administering the carbon tax is relatively straightforward as it is collected at the
same time as pre-existing taxes (e.g., the provincial excise tax on motor fuels). The carbon
tax is charged to the consumer at the point of final sale, the tax revenue is then passed from
the retailer to the wholesaler who is responsible for disclosing the revenue to the province.
It is important to note that different fuels have different carbon contents, therefore, the tax
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rate per unit of fuel differs as does the impact on the final price (Murray, 2015). As a result,
the carbon tax has an increased effect on fuels with higher carbon contents. For instance,
anthracite coal emits 228.6 pounds of carbon dioxide per million British thermal units of
energy whereas gasoline only emits 157.2 pounds of carbon dioxide (U.S. Energy
Administration). In 2015, the tax was CAD 30 per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalents
which translated to a 6.67 cents per liter tax on gasoline and a 62.31 cents per ton tax on
coal. For gasoline, this composed of merely 4.4% of the final price, while the tax on coal
comprised of 54.7% of the final price (Murray, 2015). This suggests the tax may be more
impactful in curtailing coal consumption than gasoline consumption.
A key tenet of the BC carbon tax is its revenue neutrality. Unlike other taxes,
revenues from the carbon tax are returned to residents via adjustments to personal and
corporate taxes as well as through lump-sum transfers instead of being used to fund existing
programs or increase government expenditures in other areas (Rivers & Schaufele, 2015a).
It has been advocated that using carbon tax revenues to reduce other taxes can cause a
“double dividend” effect (Goulder, 1995). This is because carbon taxes produce
environmental benefits from reducing emissions and can increase economic productivity
by reducing inefficient taxes. It should be noted, however, the carbon tax is not revenue
neutral for everyone – individuals and firms who emit more carbon pay more than what
they get back in tax cuts. This concerned rural and low-income households who feared the
burden of the tax would be disproportionately placed on them. In recognition of their
opposition and the regressiveness of energy taxes, the government implemented lump-sum
transfers to low-income individuals and grants for rural households.
Initially, two thirds of revenues from the carbon tax were returned via reductions
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in individual income tax rates and one third returned through cuts to corporate taxes
(despite industry and individual fuel purchases occurring in opposite proportions) (Peet &
Harrison, 2012). Nowadays, more than half of the cuts go to businesses. However, in 2018,
the requirement for the tax to be revenue-neutral ended. According to the BC Budget and
Fiscal Plan 2018, revenue made from raising the tax above CAD 30 will be used to provide
tax relief for low and moderate-income individuals, establish green initiatives to grow
innovation and investment, and support a clean industry program. The BC clean industry
program seeks to reduce carbon tax costs for facilities near world-leading emissions
benchmarks as well as support investment in emission reduction projects.
Another key characteristic of the carbon tax which has aided in its political success is
its transparency. Each year, the British Columbia’s Ministry of Finance is required to
present a three-year plan for recycling carbon tax revenues through tax reductions to the
Legislative Assembly for review and approval (Murray & Rivers, 2015). This provision
keeps the government accountable and ensures the tax revenues will be allocated to reduce
the unequal effects caused by the tax. Until 2018, enacted legislation required the
government to return all carbon tax revenues to individuals and firms via tax cuts,
otherwise, the Finance Minister’s salary would be reduced by 15 percent (Harrison, 2013).
Interestingly, the tax reform was revenue negative in each of the first nine years, meaning
the province gave back more in tax cuts than it collected.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Effect on Emissions and Economy
One of the primary areas of contention with carbon taxes is that they will negatively
affect the economy. This concern arises from fears that a carbon tax would cause prices to
rise which causes consumers to reduce demand and producers to restrict output, potentially
contributing to a rise in unemployment. It should be noted that these economic concerns
do not take into account the full economic impact of the tax which is intended to be neutralto-positive given the reduced environmental damages accrued from mitigating emissions.
Thus, the negative economic impact mentioned above refers solely to the costs placed on
the economy. These economic concerns have prompted researchers to study the economic
impacts of carbon taxes.
To assess the tax’s effect on the British Columbian economy, one could start by
simply examining the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita within the province and
compare it to the rest of Canada. Elgie and McClay (2013) observed that GDP per capita
growth rates in British Columbia have slightly outperformed those of the rest of the country
over the period that the carbon tax has been in place. However, Elgie and McClay did note
that it would be a stretch to claim the carbon tax had a positive impact on the economy –
such conclusions would require rigorous economic analyses controlling for numerous
factors that influence economic performance and a longer test period.
In 2013, the government of British Columbia conducted a numerical modeling
study to estimate the tax’s effect on economic performance. The study found evidence
suggesting the carbon tax had, and will continue to have, a small negative impact on GDP
in the province (British Columbia Ministry of Finance, 2013). However, as noted by
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Murray (2015), the review did not provide any details of the analysis conducted. A similar
analytical approach was taken by Beck, Rivers, Wigle, and Yonezawa who used a
computable general equilibrium model of the Canadian economy in their analysis on the
impact of the tax on households in British Columbia. Their simulations indicate that
aggregate BC welfare decreases by 0.13% without revenue recycling and 0.08% with
revenue recycling. These results support the presence of a weak double dividend effect
(revenue recycling improved welfare relative to no revenue recycling) but are not
indicative of the strong double dividend effect that the tax generates a net positive welfare
effect.
Metcalf (2015) utilized econometric analysis, specifically a difference-indifference approach to compare British Columbia’s GDP growth with the rest of Canada.
The study utilized annual data on the 13 provinces and territories over the period 1999
through 2013. Results from his analysis showed no evidence that the carbon tax had a
negative impact on economic growth in British Columbia. Metcalf believes the negligible
effect the tax had on GDP growth could be because the province’s electricity generation is
not fossil fuel-intensive and the small impact the tax had on transportation fuel prices. Also,
the decreases in personal and corporate income taxes could have dampened any negative
economic impacts of the tax.
Studies such as Yip (2018) and Yamazaki (2017) investigated the potential labor
market effects of the carbon tax. These two studies found contradicting results on the
impact the carbon tax had on unemployment in the province. Yamazaki (2017) found that
the BC carbon tax generated, on average, a 0.74 percent annual increase in employment
over the 2007-2013 period. His findings suggested that emission-intensive and trade-
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exposed sectors saw drops in employment, but the overall employment effect in the labor
market was positive. Yip (2018) found oppositional evidence in his study which suggested
the carbon tax elicited an increase in the unemployment rate by 1.3 percentage points. The
study posited that the policy depressed the aggregate labor demand leading to waves of
involuntary layoffs. There is an extensive literature on the adverse employment effects of
environmental policies. However, these policies could induce sectorial reallocation:
unaffected sectors may absorb some of the unemployed (Yip, 2018). Therefore, future
research needs to focus on the overall distributional effects of environmental taxes in the
labor market to better understand the effect of these policies on employment.
As noted by Rausch and Schwarz (2016), the public acceptance of environmental
taxes is dependent upon their distributional consequences. One of the most prominent
concerns amongst policymakers and their constituents is that carbon taxes will be
regressive or disproportionately affect rural households. The basis for these concerns is
derived from the fact that lower-income households in BC spend a larger portion of their
income on energy goods than higher-income households (Murray, 2015). Consequently,
an increase in the price of energy goods, as a result of implementing a carbon tax, would
disproportionately affect the disposable income of lower-income households.
Lee and Sanger (2013) and Lee (2011) claim the carbon tax could be regressive.
Lee and Sanger (2013) projected the BC carbon tax was progressive in its first year, but
personal and corporate income tax cuts in that year created an undesirable net benefit for
the top twenty percent of households. Additionally, the tax turned regressive as its
accompanying income redistribution mechanisms for low-income households failed to
cover the increases in the tax. However, as argued by Beck, Rivers, Wigle, and Yonezawa,

14

these studies estimated the incidence of the carbon tax by considering only the spendingside effect and not the income-side effect (2015). Using a computable general equilibrium
model, Beck, Rivers, Wigle, and Yonezawa found that the carbon tax in BC is progressive
even without the revenue recycling measures. With a similar model, Beck, Rivers, and
Yonezawa found evidence indicating that rural households were initially disadvantaged by
the tax. However, the Northern and Rural Homeowner tax credit made them net
beneficiaries from the tax on average (2016).
Overall, the primary objective of the British Columbia carbon tax was to not
negatively affect the economy while reducing greenhouse gas emissions by decreasing fuel
consumption in the province. In order to evaluate the policy’s effect on emissions,
researchers need to identify emissions post-tax and a counterfactual scenario
approximating emissions in the absence of a tax. There have been two methods used to
identify this counterfactual scenario: computational modeling and an econometric
difference-in-difference approach. Most of these econometric difference-in-difference
studies identify the counterfactual by comparing British Columbia to the rest of the
Canadian provinces. However, these studies have struggled to definitively explain the
effect of the tax due to omitted variables such as economic conditions or other policies
correlated to the tax and emissions.
Accompanying the implementation of the carbon tax, the 2008 BC Climate Action
Plan suggested, through the utilization of an energy-economy equilibrium model, that the
tax would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by three million metric tons of carbon dioxide
equivalents annually by the year 2020 in the absence of other policies (British Columbia,
2008). Subsequent research on the tax’s effect primarily uses data on fuel consumption to
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evaluate the effectiveness of the policy in curtailing emissions. In their study comparing
fuel consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and gross domestic product between British
Columbia and the rest of Canada, Stewart Elgie and Jessica McClay found evidence which
indicated that greenhouse gas emissions in BC were reduced by nine percent more than the
rest of Canada (Elgie & McClay, 2013). The only caveat with this assertion is their data
only covers three years of the tax.
The findings by Elgie and McClay were corroborated by other studies which also
found the carbon tax likely reduced gasoline demand (Beck, Rivers, Wigle, Yonezawa,
2015; Lawley & Thivierge, 2018; Antweiler & Gulati, 2016; Rivers & Schaufele, 2015a;
Erutku & Hildebrand; 2018). Rivers and Schaufele (2015a) analyzed the impact of the BC
carbon tax on gasoline consumption using a 2000-2011 monthly panel of provincial-level
data. They found the tax introduced by the Canadian province was more salient than an
equivalent change in the price of gasoline – a five-cent increase in the carbon tax reduced
demand by 8.4 percent whereas a five-cent increase in the market price of gasoline only
netted a 2.1 percent reduction in gasoline consumption. Lawley and Thivierge (2018)
utilized a Canadian household-level survey documenting annual automobile fuel
expenditures in each Canadian province. By using household-level data, they were able to
account for two potential confounding factors: major public transit improvements and
carbon leakage (discussed in the following chapter). Their analysis found evidence which
indicated that a five-cent per liter carbon tax on gasoline reduced the quantity of gasoline
demanded by 8 percent. Additionally, their analysis suggested households in Vancouver
and smaller cities respond most to the carbon tax whereas households in small towns and
rural areas do not react as strongly. In addition to reducing gasoline demand, the tax has
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also been shown to likely affect the consumption of other fuel types. For instance, in their
research on the carbon tax’s effect on residential natural gas consumption, Di Xiang and
Chad Lawley found evidence which suggested the carbon tax substantially reduced natural
gas consumption – by approximately seven percent (2019). The tax has also been found to
decrease the monthly consumption of diesel (Bernard & Kichian, 2019).
However, some studies have indicated that the tax’s effect on fuel consumption
may not be so straightforward. For example, Can Erutku and Vincent Hildebrand’s
provincial-level analysis on gasoline consumption elicited the finding that the tax had a
statistically significant effect on gasoline consumption early on, but this behavioral
response faded away over time (2018). Unlike other studies, Erutku and Hildebrand
accounted for decreases in BC gasoline consumption per capita starting in 2004, four years
before the implementation of the carbon tax. Without accounting for this trend, they purport
external factors such as carbon leakage, the purchase of fuel-efficient cars, and
advancements in public transport would overstate the impact of the carbon tax on gasoline
consumption. However, their analysis does not control for any of these factors. Rivers and
Schaufele (2015a) noted the asymmetrical time responses the carbon tax evoked on
gasoline consumption in their analysis as well. They believed a potential trigger could have
been the media coverage surrounding the carbon tax’s introduction in British Columbia.
Werner Antweiler and Sumeet Gulati (2016) utilized a monthly panel of provinciallevel gasoline consumption from 2001 to 2014 to examine the short-run impact of fuel
taxes on gasoline demand and the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles. They estimate the
removal of the BC carbon tax would be accompanied by a 7 percent increase in gasoline
consumption. Antweiler and Gulati also posited that some of the tax’s effect may actually
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be the result of shifting consumer preferences to purchase vehicles with higher fuel
efficiency (2016). They believe this to be because in the short term, carbon taxes affect
gasoline consumption of the current fleet, but in the long term, the tax’s effect is on the
size, composition, and fuel efficiency of the fleet and where people live. A study by
Nicholas Rivers and Brandon Schaufele corroborated Antweiler and Gulati’s findings.
Rivers and Schaufele found evidence indicating that a 10 percent increase in the gasoline
price caused a 0.8 percent improvement in the fuel economy of new vehicles (2017).
Alternative explanations for an amplified behavioral response include improved public
transit, anticipation (e.g., Coglianese et al., 2015), or other climate policies reducing
gasoline consumption. Thus, one of this paper’s objectives is to elucidate the carbon tax’s
effect on gasoline consumption in the short-term and the long-term and to identify whether
any outstanding factors could be producing an amplified behavioral response such as
carbon leakage.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Carbon Leakage
Leakage occurs when greenhouse gas restrictions in a certain jurisdiction increase
the emissions elsewhere (Caron, Rausch, & Winchester; 2015). Climate policies such as
carbon taxes can induce carbon leakage as they raise the price to pollute in a certain region
which causes individuals and firms to move their emission-intensive activities to the
unconstrained region. This displacement can occur both domestically and internationally.
However, domestic leakage tends to be more profound than international leakage
(McCallum, 1995; Anderson & Wincoop, 2003). Carbon leakage is most likely to occur
when the scale of the intervention is smaller than the scale of the overall problem (Wunder,
2008). In a global climate agreement, there would be no leakage because displaced
emissions would be accounted for wherever they happen (Ostwald & Henders, 2014). For
instance, a study on the potential impact of the Paris Agreement on Irish mitigation policies
estimated that the global agreement could reduce greenhouse gas emissions from imported
biomass by 32 percent (Murphy & McDonnell, 2017).
Auckland, Moura Costa, and Brown (2003) identify two types of leakage: primary
and secondary. They argue that primary leakage refers to direct leakage effects caused by
the displacement of baseline activities or agents from one area to the next whereas
secondary leakage occurs when the project's outputs create incentives for third parties to
increase emissions elsewhere. In this case, we examine an example of primary leakage, the
carbon leakage in the province of British Columbia. There is an extensive literature
documenting carbon leakage as it pertains to land-use change and deforestation (see
Ostwald & Henders (2014) for a review) and greenhouse gas policy (see Chen (2009) for
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a review). However, the literature on carbon, or gasoline leakage caused by climate policy
is sparse.
Gasoline leakage is the product of cross-border gasoline consumption by drivers
who live in a jurisdiction with high gasoline prices shopping in a jurisdiction with low
prices. This is a troublesome phenomenon for policymakers as it has the potential to nullify
the effect of climate policies such as carbon taxes. The threat is especially prominent for
jurisdictions with porous borders and strong environmental policies who share borders with
jurisdictions with weaker environmental regulations. Rivers and Schaufele (2015a) first
addressed the possibility of carbon leakage in their analysis of the BC carbon tax. They
posited that given the portion of BC residents living near the US border with Washington
State, carbon leakage could be occurring. Rivers and Schaufele controlled for this by using
the Canada-US exchange rate which has been known to motivate Canadians to cross-border
shop (Chandra, Head, & Tappata, 2014). However, their estimates showed the exchange
rate had no effect on their main results. They believe this is because the distance and
inconvenience of crossing an international border make cross-border shopping for gasoline
uneconomical.
As mentioned above, Lawley and Thivierge (2018) utilized a Canadian householdlevel survey documenting annual automobile expenditures to account for carbon leakage.
They estimate a baseline carbon tax semi-elasticity of -0.016, however, when they account
for cross border shopping, the semi-elasticity estimate is reduced to -0.013. The effect of
cross-border shopping is strongest in Vancouver. For instance, the semi-elasticity for
Vancouver falls from -0.024 to -0.019 when accounting for cross-border shopping.
Consistent with previous findings, the carbon tax semi-elasticity remained insignificant for
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small towns and rural areas, irrespective of the cross-border shopping adjustment. Thus,
Lawley and Thivierge’s analysis suggests that while cross-border shopping does not
eliminate the impact of the BC carbon tax on gasoline consumption, it does reduce its
effect.
Antweiler and Gulati (2016) were the first to perform a rigorous econometric
analysis on carbon leakage in BC. They contend that the presence of a strong Canadian
Dollar during 2010-2014 provided increased incentives for BC residents to cross-border
shop for gasoline. Using a monthly panel of provincial-level gasoline consumption from
2001 to 2014, Antweiler and Gulati utilized two methods to control for carbon leakage: an
instrumental variables approach and by modifying Shanjun Li, Joshua Linn, and Erich
Muehlegger’s gasoline demand model to include a cross-border trips variable. Their
models indicated that the carbon tax has reduced per-capita gasoline demand by one to
seven percent and cross-border travel has risen and is leading to carbon leakage.
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CHAPTER SIX
Data and Models
This analysis utilized a dataset assembled from several sources. To identify the
carbon tax’s effect on gasoline consumption, I collected and analyzed monthly data from
ten Canadian provinces for the period 1991 through 2018. I retrieved provincial monthly
retail sales of motor gasoline including all gasoline type fuel for internal combustion
engines other than aircraft from Statistics Canada (Table 25-10-0044-01). The retail
provincial monthly retail sales of gasoline data was then converted from cubic meters of
gasoline to liters. As in Small and Van Dender (2007) and Rivers and Schaufele (2015a),
aggregate provincial sales of gasoline was divided by provincial population aged 15 years
or older to create a per adult (referred to hereinafter as per capita) gasoline consumption
variable (Table 14-10-0287-03).
I also collected data on the various characteristics of provinces that influence
gasoline consumption. Similar to Rivers and Schaufele (2015a), Xiang and Lawley (2019),
and Eruktu and Hildebrand (2018), data was collected documenting the price of gasoline,
real per capita income, unemployment rates, value of building permits, and retail trade
sales. Each of these variables are important factors to consider when determining per capita
gasoline consumption. Summary statistics for the aforementioned variables can be found
in Figure 1. All prices and income figures were converted to 2012 Canadian dollars by
using the Canadian all-items consumer price index (CPI) retrieved from Statistics Canada
(Table 326-0020).
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Figure 1: Descriptive Statistics

British Columbia
VARIABLE

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Observations

Per capita gasoline
consumption (liters)
Unemployment rate
Policies
Cross-border trips
Per capita GDP
(CAD)
Tax exclusive price of
gas (cents/liter)
Tax inclusive price of
Gas (cents/liter)
Gas taxes (cents/liter)

102.94

10.74

67.19

130.76

346

7.32
0
447018.7
55247.84

1.69
0
184465.6
5597.48

4
0
170305
47692.9

10.90
0
973666
65954.74

348
348
348
348

60.69

20.64

15.43

110.03

348

101.56

23.72

51.71

150.61

348

38.87

1.82

34.36

42.50

348

8.97
187549.9

12.52
41380.79

0
126129

31.69
264063

348
348

3355.28

418.37

2513.3

4058.5

348

Carbon tax (CAD)
Real GDP
(x1,000,000)
Population (in
thousands)

Other Canadian Provinces
VARIABLE

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Observations

Per capita gasoline
consumption (liters)
Unemployment rate
Policies
Cross-border trips
Per capita GDP
(CAD)
Tax exclusive price of
gas (cents/liter)
Tax inclusive price of
Gas (cents/liter)
Gas taxes (cents/liter)

130.02

27.85

49.53

514.42

3038

9.21
0.07
145469
60114.33

3.70
0.25
265602.2
18725.85

3
0
0
33771.49

22.10
1
1498522
108078.20

3132
3132
3132
3132

60.54

18.61

22.95

112.12

3024

96.70

19.10

56.25

151.97

3031

36.27

6.20

0

27.49

3031

0.17

2.03

0

27.49

3132

150825.20

191492.2

3340

778518

3132

2469.24

3192.98

97.9

11998.7

3132

Carbon tax (CAD)
Real GDP
(x1,000,000)
Population (in
thousands)

Consistent with Rivers and Schaufele (2015a) and Eruktu and Hildebrand (2018),
gasoline price and excise tax information was collected from Kent Marketing Services
Limited. All prices and taxes were adjusted for inflation using the aforementioned
consumer price indices. Retail prices from each province’s largest urban center are used as
proxies for the retail price for the entire province (with the exception of Saskatchewan in
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which Regina was used instead of Saskatoon due to data limitations). As mentioned by
Rivers and Schaufele (2015a), while there is a high degree of price correlation with each
province, using the urban center as a proxy for the entire province will mask some intraprovincial heterogeneity. However, interprovincial variation is greater than intraprovincial
variation as a result of the different excise tax regimes implemented by each province.
Figure 2 displays this interprovincial variation in fuel prices as well as per capita gasoline
consumption. Information on gasoline taxes was also collected from Kent Marketing
Services Limited. To find the excise tax for each province, the price of fuel without taxes
in each urban center was subtracted from the price of fuel with taxes to net the gas tax in
each province. Carbon taxes were also subtracted out of each province’s gasoline tax totals.
Figure 2: Summary Statistics

Per Capita Gasoline Consumption (in liters) Tax-Inclusive Gasoline
(cents per liter)

Price

Province

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

BC
AB
MB
NB
NL
NS
ON
PEI
QB
SK

102.94
144.01
119.54
133.68
123.84
124.99
115.72
147.62
102.96
156.95

10.74
12.60
11.34
21.65
35.43
18.48
8.42
28.59
8.10
29.35

67.19
92.22
91.81
81.48
75.10
49.53
78.60
89.18
72.34
83.31

130.76
200.42
155.80
315.43
301.28
237.07
156.34
300.51
131.09
218.81

101.56
87.51
90.93
103.96
104.63
98.35
93.88
97.00
101.81
94.37

23.72
18.10
17.44
16.78
17.65
19.34
19.37
18.04
19.65
17.93

51.71
56.25
61.59
57.78
72.20
64.24
63.85
62.50
68.92
59.12

150.61
135.71
139.57
142.48
151.97
146.33
137.85
143.19
148.32
145.18

I obtained provincial real gross domestic product (GDP) from Statistics Canada
(Table 36-10-0222-01) and divided it by working age population (Table 14-10-0287-03)
to convert real GDP to real gross domestic product per capita. Unemployment rate (Table
14-10-0287-01), retail trade sale (Table 20-10-0008-01), and building permits (Table: 3410-0003-01) were all retrieved from Statistics Canada. Finally, to account for the presence
of carbon leakage, data on the number of vehicle trips to bordering US states was collected.
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Monthly provincial border crossing data was retrieved from Statistics Canada (Table 2410-0002-01). In addition, I obtained monthly data on U.S. border state gasoline prices from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration to create a carbon tax exclusive price
differential variable. To do this, I first converted the US gasoline prices to Canadian dollars
per liter. Then, I subtracted the US gasoline prices from their corresponding Canadian
province’s gasoline price. Due to limited data availability, monthly tax-inclusive US
gasoline prices could only be found by Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts
(PADD) with the exception of the state of Washington. To account for the fact that some
provinces border multiple states or PADDs, the US prices of gasoline were weighted by
the proportion of Canadians crossing the border into that state or PADD. The proportions
were calculated using data from the U.S. Department of Transportation which tracks
incoming traffic into each port of the United States. This data does not separate Canadian
and American vehicle crossings. Therefore, I combined this dataset with Statistics Canada
(Table 24-10-0002-01) to identify the proportion of Canadian traffic from each province.
These proportions were then used to calculate how much of the incoming traffic to each
port would have been Canadian vehicles. It should be acknowledged that in some cases,
this method will attribute border crossings to the wrong province. This method relies on
the assumption that Canadians will cross the nearest border within their own province when
crossing the border.
Figure 3 displays the net sales of gasoline in the province of British Columbia for
each month of the period 1990-2018. As illustrated in the graph, gasoline consumption is
subject to a fair amount of seasonality. Therefore, to get a clearer indication of the yearly
trends for gasoline consumption, the monthly data was averaged to obtain a twelve month
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moving average. The annual retail sales of gasoline are illustrated in Figure 4. Aggregate
gasoline demand has been relatively stagnant from 1998-2012, decreasing slightly over
this period (-3.39%). However, from 2012-2018, aggregate gasoline consumption
increased by eleven percent.
Figure 3: Aggregate Gasoline Demand in British Columbia (1990-2018)
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Figure 4: Annual Aggregate Gasoline Demand in British Columbia (1990-2018)

Figure 5 illustrates per capita gasoline consumption in the province of British
Columbia and reveals there was a downward trend four years before the implementation
of the tax. After the implementation of the tax, per capita gasoline consumption continued
to fall until 2012. In 2018, the per capita gasoline consumption was 8.46 percent higher
than in 2008, the year the tax was implemented. In other words, on average each British
Columbian used 8.23 more liters of gasoline in 2018 than in 2008. In Figure 6, per capita
gasoline consumption in British Columbia is compared to the other Canadian provinces.
Compared to the other provinces, British Columbia’s per capita gasoline consumption has
been relatively flat and lower on average. There appears to be a slight trend pertaining to
recent mitigation attempts by provinces. Those provinces with high per capita gasoline
consumption have been able to reduce their gasoline consumption in the past couple of
years, whereas provinces with lower per capita gasoline consumption have experienced a
slight increase in consumption over that same period despite mitigation attempts.
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Figure 5: BC Per Capita Gasoline Consumption (1990-2018)

Figure 6: Per Capita Gasoline Consumption (1990-2018)

In Figure 7, the tax inclusive price of gasoline is graphed for the province of British
Columbia. It shows seasonality in the price of gasoline as the price is on average, higher in
the summer months. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the price and tax movements for the four
large Canadian provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. Figure 8
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depicts that retail prices of gasoline had been steadily increasing since 1998, with the
exception of 2008 in which the recession lead to a significant drop in crude oil prices
(Antweiler and Gulati, 2016). Total fuel and carbon taxes for the four large Canadian
provinces are shown in Figure 9. The trends in this graph are especially crucial to this
analysis. Taxes are adjusted for inflation using the aforementioned consumer price indices.
The inflation adjustment partially explains why total taxes peaked in BC in 2013 as the
carbon tax increased to CAD 30 in mid 2012 and remained there until 2018. Nonetheless,
taxes have mostly trended upwards since 1990. The province of Quebec has had a strict
gasoline tax regime as in most of the years its total taxes were higher than British
Columbia’s. Alberta’s own carbon tax is also visible by this graph. The Albertan carbon
tax started at CAD 20 in 2017 and increased to CAD 30 in 2018 until it was repealed at the
end of that year.
Figure 7: BC Tax Inclusive Price of Gasoline (1990-2018)
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Figure 8: Retail Prices of Gasoline - Large Canadian Provinces (1990-2018)

Figure 9: Total Gas and Carbon Taxes - Large Canadian Provinces (1990-2018)
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As a result of increased taxation differentials between provinces and countries,
carbon leakage, more specifically cross-border trips, have become an important factor to
consider. Figures 10 and 11 shed light on the nature of cross-border trips over the period
1990-2018. Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador were
dropped from the carbon leakage analyses presented in this paper as they do not have allseason border traffic to the US. Figure 10 shows that cross-border trips in British Columbia
increased dramatically from 2009 to 2013. This is likely a product of rising gasoline prices
and a strong Canadian dollar over this same time period. Figure 11 indicates that this same
trend in cross-border trips from 2009-2013 was also experienced in the province of Ontario.
However, the other provinces were unaffected by the strong Canadian dollar. Therefore, it
possible that the carbon tax in BC was a driving force in the increase in cross-border trips.
It should be noted that even as the Canadian dollar weakened in 2014 and 2015, crossborder trips remained well above their 2008 levels in British Columbia. Figures 12 and 13
depict per capita cross-border trips for British Columbia and all Canadian provinces
respectively. These graphs display the same trends as the aggregate cross-border trips with
respect to the province of British Columbia. However, as can be seen in Figure 13, when
controlling for population, New Brunswick’s cross-border traffic is much more profound.
Conversely, Ontario does not appear to have as strong as a reaction to the strong Canadian
dollar in 2009-2013.

31

Figure 10: Cross-Border Trips: British Columbia (1990-2018)

Figure 11: Cross-Border Trips (1990-2018)
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To estimate the effect of carbon taxes on gasoline demand, I utilized insights from
Li et al. (2014), Rivers and Schaufele (2015a), Antweiler and Gulati (2016), and Eruktu
and Hildebrand (2018). In decomposing gasoline consumption, I econometrically followed
the approaches employed by Rivers and Schaufele (2015a) and Li et al. (2014). The retail
price of gasoline – the price consumers see at the pumps – was split into three parts: a taxexclusive price, a gas tax, and a carbon tax. Additional controls are included to generate
the following equation:
1) log 𝑦() = 𝛽, + 𝛽. 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑥() + 𝛽7 𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒() + 𝛽> 𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠() + 𝛽? 𝑋() + δ( + 𝛾) + 𝜀()

where 𝑦() is gasoline consumption per capita in province i during time period t,
𝛽. 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑥() is the inflation-adjusted carbon tax in province i during time period t,
𝛽7 𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒() is the tax-exclusive inflation-adjusted retail price of gasoline for province i
during time period t, 𝛽> 𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠() is the inflation-adjusted gas taxes for province i during
time period t, 𝛽? 𝑋() portrays any time varying provincial-level variables that may affect
gasoline consumption - these include GDP per capita, business controls (unemployment
rates, retail sales, and building permits) and dummy variables for carbon mitigating policies
and public transit expansions. δ( is a province fixed effect which captures all unobservable
time-invariant provincial heterogeneities such as culture, 𝛾) is a time fixed effect capturing
any time-specific unobservable factors, and 𝜀() is the error term. The first empirical model
specification is estimated over two time periods: 1991-2018 and 1991-2011.
The first model was then modified to estimate the impact of carbon leakage on the
carbon tax’s effect in mitigating gasoline consumption in British Columbia. The following
model was considered over the period 1991-2018:
2) log 𝑦() = 𝛽, + 𝛽. 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑥() + 𝛽7 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠() + 𝛽> 𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒() + 𝛽? 𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠()
+ 𝛽H 𝑋() + δ( + 𝛾) + 𝜀()
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This model adopts a naive approach to control for carbon leakage in the province of British
Columbia where 𝛽7 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠() refers to the count of all cross-border trips made
by Canadians to the United States. The final model considered in this paper, modifies
model 2 by replacing the gas price and gas tax controls with a carbon tax exclusive retail
gasoline price differential control and an interaction term between the price difference and
border crossings. The final empirical model specification was estimated over the period
2003-2018.
3) log 𝑦() = 𝛽, + 𝛽. 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑥() + 𝛽7 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠() + 𝛽> 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒()
+ 𝛽? 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒() ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠() + 𝛽H 𝑋() + δ( + 𝛾) + 𝜀()
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Results
Figure 14 displays the estimates of the effects of gasoline prices and carbon taxes
on gasoline consumption over the period 1991-2018. It should be noted that the 2017-2018
Albertan carbon tax was coded as a gas tax rather than a carbon tax. As can be seen in
Appendix A, the carbon tax in Alberta did not have a meaningful impact on gasoline
consumption like the tax in BC. This is likely a consequence of the tax’s short existence
(two years) and the policy working alongside an ETS. In addition, its quick withdrawal
could indicate that the electorate refused to accept the tax and adapt their behaviors.
Regression (1) estimates the effect of the carbon tax on gasoline consumption with GDP
per capita controls as well as time and province fixed effects. The regression also includes
the following business cycle controls: unemployment rates, retail sales, and value of
building permits. The estimates from this regression indicate that the carbon tax had a
statistically significant negative impact on gasoline consumption, whereas GDP per capita
had a statistically significant positive impact on gasoline consumption.
Regression (2) adds price of gasoline and gas tax controls as well as a dummy
variable controlling for any major climate policy implemented in a province which would
reduce the consumption of gasoline. In regression (2), the results indicate that the carbon
tax in British Columbia had a practically and statistically significant negative effect on the
per capita consumption of gasoline. In addition, the price of gasoline was found to be
statistically and practically significant. The estimates for the effects of the price of gasoline
and the carbon tax in British Columbia reveal that the reduction in gasoline consumption
induced by the carbon tax was nearly 10 times larger than an equivalent increase in the
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price of gasoline all else constant. Specifically, the results estimate that a five-cent increase
in the price of gasoline will reduce gasoline consumption by 0.635%, while an equivalent
increase in the carbon tax translates to a 9.3% reduction in gasoline consumption. The
carbon tax is also estimated to be more effective in curtailing gasoline consumption than
gas taxes. For instance, regression (2) estimates that a five-cent increase in gas taxes would
only decrease gasoline consumption by 1.74% holding all other factors constant. Other
carbon mitigating policies were estimated to have a statistically significant negative impact
on gasoline consumption, decreasing consumption by 7.38% all else constant.
Recent research on the effect of the British Columbia carbon tax in mitigating
gasoline consumption has indicated that there may have been an amplified behavioral
response to the tax in the years immediately following the implementation of the tax
(Eruktu & Hildebrand, 2018). This is contrary to the belief that people slowly change their
behaviors to carbon taxes, which implies a weak short-term effect and a stronger long-term
effect. An amplified behavioral response in the years directly following the implementation
of the tax may indicate that carbon taxes have different short-term and long-term effects
on gasoline consumption than previously thought. To analyze the possibility of an
amplified behavioral response to the tax in the three years immediately following the
implementation of the tax, I utilized an interaction term consisting of a 2008-2011 period
dummy variable and the carbon tax. The interaction term will isolate any enhanced effect
from the carbon tax that may have occurred during the 2008-2011-time period.
Regression (3) estimates the effect of the carbon tax with controls for GDP per
capita, time fixed effects, province fixed effects, and the business cycle. This regression
indicates the carbon tax had a statistically significant negative impact on gasoline
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consumption while the interaction term was not statistically significant but was estimated
to have a negative effect on gasoline consumption. If these estimates held true, in the shortterm, a 1-dollar increase in the carbon would have decreased gasoline consumption by
0.6% whereas in the long term, gasoline consumption would have been reduced by only
0.422%. Regression (4) adds the price of gas, gas taxes, and policies as controls and finds
similar results. In this regression, a five-cent increase in the carbon tax in the long-run
would decrease gasoline consumption by 8.9% all else constant. However, in the short-run,
the regression suggests the carbon tax would reduce gasoline consumption by 12%. These
regressions offer some evidence of an amplified behavioral response during 2008-2011
leading to a greater reduction in gasoline consumption. However, it should be noted that
the interaction term was not statistically significant in regression (4). Further evidence of
an amplified behavioral response in the years immediately following the tax’s
implementation and a weaker long-term effect can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 14: Estimates of the effect of gas prices and carbon taxes on gas consumption (1991-2018)
Independent
Variables
Carbon tax

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent Variable: Log of monthly per capita gasoline
consumption (liters)
-0.00445**
-0.00414*
-0.00422*
-0.00397*
(0.00128)
(0.00131)
(0.00141)
(0.00144)

Carbon tax*(08-11)

GDP per capita

0.0000153***
(0.00000209)

0.0000144***
(0.00000162)

-0.00178
(0.00153)

-0.00138
(0.00157)

0.0000152***
(0.00000209)

0.0000144***
(0.00000163)

Price of gas

-0.00127*
(0.000484)

-0.00129*
(0.000482)

Gas taxes

-0.00348
(0.00186)

-0.00341
(0.00186)

Policies

-0.0738*
(0.0320)

-0.0737*
(0.0321)

Business cycle
Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-Year fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4.261***
(0.149)
3167
0.524

4.035***
(0.190)
3263
0.509

4.258***
(0.153)
3167
0.524

4.036***
(0.189)
N
3263
R2
0.508
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Constant

In addition to an interaction term, I also shortened the time period considered in
these regressions by seven years to cover the period 1991-2011. This was the same time
period considered by Rivers and Schaufele (2015) in their analysis of the carbon tax. This
time period was also included in the approach utilized by Eruktu and Hildebrand (2018)
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when they investigated the potential for an amplified behavioral response to the tax.
Appendix C displays the estimates for the shortened time period.
All regressions in Appendix C are specified with time and province fixed effects.
Regression (1) estimates the effect of the carbon tax on gasoline consumption with controls
for GDP per capita and the business cycle. Regression (1) indicates that the carbon tax had
a statistically significant negative impact on gasoline consumption while GDP per capita
had a statistically significant positive impact. Compared to its corresponding regression in
Figure 14, the carbon tax in Appendix C is estimated to have a larger effect on gasoline
consumption. Interestingly, all of the regressions in Appendix C depict the carbon tax
having a larger negative effect on gasoline consumption than their corresponding
regressions with an extended time frame found in Figure 14. This could indicate that the
tax had a larger effect in reducing gasoline consumption in the short-term than it did in the
long-term. For instance, in regression (2) of Appendix C, the carbon tax was estimated to
reduce gasoline consumption by 0.757% for every dollar increase in the carbon tax holding
all other factors constant. However, its corresponding regression in Figure 14 estimated the
carbon tax in British Columbia to reduce gasoline consumption by a mere 0.414%. If these
figures held true, that would signify that the carbon tax had a 1.83 times larger effect on
gasoline consumption in the shortened time period than it did over the longer time period.
In regression (4) of Appendix C, a Canada Line dummy variable was introduced. The
Canada Line dummy variable refers to the expansion of the SkyTrain metro system in
Vancouver which opened in 2009. Contrary to its hypothesized effect, the regression
indicated that the Canada Line dummy variable had a statistically significant positive effect
on gasoline consumption - increasing gasoline consumption by 9.5%.
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As in Antweiler and Gulati (2016), I adopted a naive approach to control for carbon
leakage by modifying the Li et al. (2014) gasoline demand model to include a variable
accounting for cross-border trips. Unlike Antweiler and Gulati (2016), this analysis does
not assume that gas taxes in the United States remained relatively flat over the time period
considered. Therefore, I introduced a price difference control between the United States
and Canada to help reduce the endogeneity of cross-border travel (discussed more below).
Figure 15 estimates the effects of carbon taxes and carbon leakage on gasoline consumption
over the period 1991-2018. It should be noted that this data only covers seven provinces as
Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador were dropped from
this analysis due to a lack of all-season border traffic to the United States.
Regression (1) of Figure 15 estimates the effect of the carbon tax on gasoline
consumption with business cycle controls, GDP per capita, and aggregate border crossing
as controls. The regression suggests aggregate border crossings triggered a statistically
significant decreases in monthly per capita gasoline consumption. The carbon tax was
estimated to have a statistically insignificant effect on gasoline consumption. Regression
(2) adds the price of gasoline, gas taxes, and a policy dummy variable as controls. In
regression (2), the carbon tax is estimated to have a statistically significant negative effect
on gasoline consumption. This regression indicates that a five cent increase in the carbon
tax would be associated with a 5.7% decrease in monthly per capita gasoline consumption.
In addition, the estimated effect of total provincial border crossings on gasoline
consumption is statistically significant and negative. By inserting the difference from
monthly average border crossings in 2018 and 2008 (188,245), the regression estimates
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that the added monthly border crossings would net a 2.45% reduction in per capita gasoline
consumption holding all other factors constant.
Regression (3) uses a per capita border crossings variable to control for population
changes which could have caused border crossings to increase over time. Regression (3)
suggests that the carbon tax and per capita border crossings had statistically significant
negative effects on monthly per capita gasoline consumption. GDP per capita was
estimated to have a statistically significant positive effect on gasoline consumption. In
regression (4), the carbon tax, GDP per capita, and policy variables are statistically
significant. In this regression, holding all other factors constant, the increase in average
monthly per capita border crossings from 2008 to 2018 would be associated with a 1.24%
decrease in gasoline consumption.
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Figure 15: Estimates of the effects of carbon taxes and carbon leakage on gasoline consumption
(1991-2018)
(1)
Independent
Variables
Carbon tax

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent Variable: Log of monthly per capita gasoline consumption
-0.00250
(0.00112)

-0.00254*
(0.000848)

-0.00283*
(0.00112)

-0.00288*
(0.00112)

GDP per capita

0.0000179**
(0.00000339)

0.0000147**
(0.00000335)

0.0000181***
(0.00000297)

0.0000142**
(0.00000273)

Border crossings

-0.000000173*
(7.02e-08)

-0.000000130*
(4.47e-08)
-0.336*
(0.103)

-0.263
(0.209)

Per capita border
crossings
Price of gas

-0.000227
(0.000264)

-0.000139
(0.000285)

Gas taxes

-0.00427
(0.00279)

-0.00501
(0.00272)

Policies

-0.0748**
(0.0167)

-0.0730**
(0.0184)

Business cycle
controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-Year
fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3.989***
(0.214)
2185
0.574

3.651***
(0.143)
2281
0.552

4.024***
(0.163)
2185
0.570

3.671***
(0.169)
N
2281
R2
0.548
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Constant

The regressions in Figure 15 provide some evidence that carbon leakage may be
responsible for some of the decrease in gasoline consumption in the province of British
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Columbia. In each regression, the results indicate that the carbon tax had a reduced effect
on gasoline consumption when carbon leakage was controlled for. However, the estimates
in these regressions are not reliable given the endogeneity of cross-border travel. As noted
in Antweiler and Gulati (2016), in the presence of carbon leakage, gasoline prices, carbon
taxes, and gas taxes also influence cross-border travel. A lower price for gasoline will make
it cheaper to travel to the border, while a higher price differential between the British
Columbian and Washington gasoline prices would increase the number of cross-border
trips for refueling. Additionally, higher domestic taxes would increase the price differential
increasing the likelihood of crossing the border. Antweiler and Gulati (2016) argue that
GDP per capita, province fixed effects (capturing distance to the border), and time fixed
effects (capturing seasonality), also influence cross-border trips. This endogeneity impacts
the coefficients for not only border crossings but also the carbon tax. Therefore, even
though there is likely carbon leakage in the province of BC, the effect it has on gasoline
consumption cannot be estimated with a high degree of confidence from the coefficients
shown in Figure 15.
To reduce the endogeneity of cross-border travel, a price difference variable was
introduced to the model. As mentioned earlier, Antweiler and Gulati (2016) assumed that
gasoline taxes in the United States were relatively flat in the time period covered by their
model. As a result, they posited that the Canadian gasoline taxes would be a sufficient
proxy for the gasoline price differential between the United States and Canada. However,
as illustrated in Figure 16, gasoline taxes in the United States did not remain flat. Most
notably, in the state of Washington, gasoline taxes increased from 23 cents per gallon in
2001 to 44.5 cents per gallon in 2015. In short, increases in Canadian gasoline taxes would
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not accurately control for the price difference as US taxes were also increasing over this
same time period in jurisdictions influencing cross-border travel.
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Figure 16: Washington Gasoline Taxes (2000-2018)
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Figure 17 displays the estimates of the effects of carbon taxes and carbon leakage
with the price differential control on gasoline consumption. Due to limited availability of
US gasoline price data, the time period considered in these regressions was shortened to
cover only 2003-2018. Regression (1) estimates the effect of the carbon tax on gasoline
consumption with GDP per capita, aggregate border crossings, US-Canada gasoline price
difference, and business cycle controls. The results indicate that the carbon tax has a
statistically significant negative effect on gasoline consumption at the ten percent level of
significance. Both border crossings and price difference are estimated to have a statistically
insignificant negative effect on gasoline consumption holding all other factors constant.
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Regression (2) adds an interaction between price difference and border crossings. This
regression suggests the interaction term’s effect on border crossings and the price
difference is negative, but statistically insignificant. Thus, even though border crossings
variable is positive in this regression, the overall effect of the border crossings could
become negative when you consider the interaction term. The carbon tax is estimated to
have a statistically significant negative effect on gasoline consumption. A five cent increase
in the carbon tax would be associated with a 6.13% reduction in monthly per capita gasoline
consumption all else constant.
In regression (3), I dropped the business cycle controls as it more closely reflects
the controls considered in Antweiler & Gulati (2016). This regression suggests the price
difference-border crossings interaction term was statistically significant at the ten percent
level. By inserting the difference from monthly average border crossings in 2018 and 2008
and the price difference (CAD 0.04 per liter), the regression estimates that the added
monthly border crossings would increase monthly per capita gasoline consumption by
1.7% holding all other factors constant. This result would suggest that there is likely not a
lot of gasoline leakage between the state of Washington and British Columbia. However,
given the effect of the interaction term, if the price difference was large enough, border
crossings could reduce gasoline consumption, and by extension, reduce the carbon tax’s
effect on gasoline consumption. The sign and statistical significance of the interaction term
indicates that higher prices in one jurisdiction is associated with a negative effect on the
effect of border crossings on gasoline consumption. Thus, a higher price differential, as a
consequence of supply shocks, increased gas taxes, or a carbon tax, could lead to gasoline
leakage.
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Regressions (4) and (5) consider per capita border crossings rather than aggregate
monthly border crossings with business cycle controls. In regression (4) the carbon tax and
GDP per capita remain statistically significant, but the price difference and per capita
border crossing variables were statistically insignificant. In this regression the estimated
effect of the price difference is negative whereas per capita border crossings is positive. In
regression (5), an interaction between per capita border crossings and the price difference
was introduced. This regression suggests that both the price difference and per capita
border crossings have statistically insignificant negative effects on gasoline consumption.
The interaction term suggests that an increase in the price difference would reduce the
negative effect of border crossings on gasoline consumption. However, the interaction term
is also statistically insignificant.
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Figure 17: Estimates of the effects of carbon taxes and carbon leakage on gasoline consumption (2003-2018)
(1)
Independent
Variables
Carbon tax
GDP per capita
Border Crossings
Price difference

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Dependent Variable: Log of monthly per capita gasoline consumption
-0.00233
(0.00102)

-0.00273*
(0.00111)

-0.00353*
(0.00132)

-0.00381*
(0.00120)

-0.00374*
(0.00119)

0.0000186**
(0.00000348)

0.0000184**
(0.00000361)

0.0000178**
(0.00000410)

0.0000187**
(0.00000361)

0.0000189**
(0.00000346)

-9.66e-08
(8.72e-08)

3.19e-08
(0.000000129)

0.000000105
(0.000000120)

-0.131
(0.0897)

-0.0758
(0.111)

-0.0821
(0.117)

-0.167
(0.0944)

-0.222
(0.119)

0.226
(0.200)

-0.172
(0.378)

Per capita border
crossings
Price difference *
Border crossings

-0.000000273
(0.000000189)

-0.000000364
(0.000000169)

Per capita border
crossings * Price
difference

1.056
(0.812)

Business cycle
controls

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Province fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-Year
fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3.491***
(0.250)
1268
0.429

3.614***
(0.285)
1268
0.422

3.492***
(0.259)
1268
0.427

3.501***
(0.256)
1268
0.428

3.490***
(0.240)
N
1268
R2
0.428
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Constant

Appendix D shows the estimates of the effects on an amplified behavioral response
to a carbon tax with carbon leakage controls on gasoline consumption. Border crossings
and price difference controls were added to verify whether or not carbon leakage was
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causing an amplified behavioral response to the tax. It is noteworthy that the amplified
behavioral response was statistically significant at the 5% level in regressions (2) and (4),
and statistically significant at the 10% level in regressions (1) and (3). Each regression
indicates that from 2008-2011, holding all else constant, a dollar increase in the carbon tax
reduced gasoline consumption by 0.23% - 0.31% more than an equivalent dollar increase
in the carbon tax outside of that period. Additionally, the estimates of the reduction in
gasoline consumption are within the previously mentioned bounds set by the literature. In
the long run, the regressions estimate that a five-cent increase in the carbon tax would be
associated with a 4.5% - 7.4% decrease in the monthly per capita consumption of gasoline
holding all other factors constant. The regressions in figure 17 provide further evidence
that an amplified behavioral response likely occurred in the years immediately following
the implementation of the carbon tax. If there are no omitted variables, this could indicate
that the British Columbia carbon tax’s effect on gasoline consumption has weakened in the
long-term.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusion
Many governments across the world have successfully implemented climate
policies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. However, the effectiveness of these policies
in reaching their environmental objectives may be in jeopardy. This paper analyzed the
effectiveness of one such policy, the British Columbia carbon tax, in reducing gasoline
consumption within the province. Through a wide-range of econometric specifications, this
analysis provides evidence, consistent with previous studies, that the British Columbia
carbon tax did reduce gasoline consumption. Using a monthly provincial-level data set
considering the period 1991-2018, a five-cent increase in the carbon tax, all else constant,
was associated with a 5 to 9.3 percent reduction in per capita gasoline consumption. This
result is consistent with findings from Rivers and Schaufele (2015a) who estimated that a
five-cent increase in the carbon tax decreased gasoline consumption by 8.4 percent.
Despite the British Columbian carbon tax’s success in reducing per capita gasoline
consumption, policymakers should be concerned that the tax’s effect has not reduced
aggregate gasoline demand. In fact, aggregate gasoline demand is at its highest levels ever
as illustrated in Figure 4. Additionally, per capita gasoline consumption has been
increasing steadily since 2012. These are two concerning trends that have not been reversed
as a result of the implementation of the carbon tax. Policymakers should also be concerned
that the effect of the carbon tax has not been constant over time.
As in Erutku and Hildebrand, this paper evaluated the possibility of the carbon tax
producing an amplified behavioral response. Through the use of a shortened data set and
an interaction term with the original data set, this analysis found evidence supporting
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Erutku and Hildebrand’s findings of an amplified behavioral response. In comparing the
long-term and short-term effects of the carbon tax, the short-run effect of the carbon tax
was estimated to decrease gasoline consumption at a higher propensity than in the longrun. Thus, this seems to support the notion that amplified behavioral responses to carbon
taxes could be a short-term phenomenon if there are no omitted explanatory variables. The
results from this analysis appear to indicate that the carbon tax’s effect on gasoline
consumption has been diminishing over time. This finding contradicts the notion that
consumers take time to change their behavior and even more so to adapt their lifestyles.
According to the aforementioned results, consumers appeared to alter their behavior in the
short-term, but have partially reverted back to their old tendencies in the long-term. For
policymakers, this diminishing response is troubling. Carbon taxes are often the
centerpiece of greenhouse gas reduction plans. If these policy instruments fail to
incentivize consumers to change their behaviors and lifestyles in the long-run, nations will
be unable to reach greenhouse gas reduction goals. However, there may be outstanding
factors explaining the amplified behavioral response in the short-term such as the adoption
of more fuel efficient vehicles or carbon leakage, therefore, additional research should be
conducted so more definitive conclusions on the long-term and short-term effects of carbon
taxes can be reached.
The presence of carbon leakage could signify that previous analyses of the carbon
tax overstated its effect in mitigating gasoline consumption. As in Antweiler and Gulati
(2016), I adopted a similar approach to control for carbon leakage by creating a variable of
the count of all cross-border trips made by Canadians to the United States. This analysis
departed from Antweiler and Gulati’s analysis by adding extra controls for time variant
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variables which affect gasoline consumption and by controlling for the price differential
between the United States and Canada. Overall, the results indicate that carbon leakage is
likely present in the province of British Columbia, and is currently having a very minute
effect on the per capita consumption of gasoline. However, the findings within this paper
suggest that increases in the price difference are associated with a larger negative effect of
border crossings on gasoline consumption. Therefore, carbon taxes as well as other climate
policies affecting the prices of energy-intensive goods have the ability to induce crossborder shopping, and by extension carbon leakage. If the price differential is large enough,
carbon leakage has the ability to undermine the effectiveness of the British Columbia
carbon tax. In the future, policymakers will need to be cognizant of neighboring
jurisdiction’s regulations when creating climate policies, especially as states become more
interconnected producing more porous borders. Otherwise, carbon leakage can nullify the
effect of carbon taxes and increase the incentive for the neighboring jurisdiction to uphold
their lax regulations. If this is the case, the costs of enacting a unilateral climate policy
could be greater than first perceived.
Future research should focus on the short-term and long-term effects of carbon
taxes on gasoline consumption. In addition, research should investigate the effects of
carbon leakage. Finally, studies will need to be conducted on the effects that increased
public transportation ridership and electric vehicles have on a carbon tax’s effect on
gasoline consumption. Throughout the regressions considered in this paper, the Canada
Line was largely shown to have increased monthly per capita gasoline consumption.
However, given the drastic increase in transit ridership caused by the Canada Line
expansion as can be seen in Appendix E, this result is highly unlikely. Therefore, it is
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possible the coefficients may be positive due to the specification of the Canada Line as a
dummy variable and the fact that it was introduced one year after the carbon tax which may
be absorbing some of its effect on gasoline consumption. Previous literature, as well as the
model specifications above, have tried to control for a single expansion through the
inclusion of a dummy variable. However, this fails to consider the multiple expansions and
events which affect transit ridership and by extension, gasoline consumption. Future work
evaluating the effects of carbon policies on gasoline consumption should consider
alternative methods for controlling for transit ridership.
Finally, the electrification of the transportation sector presents the opportunity to
drastically reduce carbon emissions in BC given its large hydropower resources. Whereas
jurisdictions who are dependent on fossil fuels for electricity generation could potentially
see an increase in emissions. As a result, policymakers will need to be cognizant that
improved public transit and electric vehicles currently confound the estimation of a carbon
tax’s effect on gasoline consumption, and they will play pivotal roles in determining the
effectiveness of future climate policies.
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APPENDIX A

Estimates of the effects of gasoline prices and carbon taxes on gas consumption (1991-2018)
(1)
Independent
Variables
Carbon tax

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent Variable: Log of monthly per capita gasoline consumption
(liters)
-0.000691
0.0000225
0.000965
0.00133
(0.00146)
(0.00119)
(0.00152)
(0.00141)

Carbon tax*BC

-0.00378*
(0.00156)

-0.00333*
(0.00139)

-0.00558*
(0.00211)

-0.00606
(0.00284)

GDP per capita

0.0000153***
(0.00000207)

0.0000149***
(0.00000170)

0.0000150***
(0.00000211)

0.0000143***
(0.00000166)

Price of gas

-0.00142*
(0.000493)

-0.00151**
(0.000428)

-0.00123*
(0.000486)

Gas taxes

-0.00400
(0.00209)

-0.00394*
(0.00173)
-0.0775*
(0.0338)

Policies
Canada Line

-0.0769*
(0.0329)
0.0197
(0.0481)

Business
cycle controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province-fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-Year
fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4.270***
(0.152)
3167
0.515

4.122***
(0.202)
3167
0.521

4.289***
(0.147)
3167
0.525

4.033***
(0.190)
N
3263
R2
0.508
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Constant
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APPENDIX B
Estimates of the effects of carbon taxes and gasoline prices on gasoline consumption (1991-2018)
(1)

Independent Variable
Carbon tax
Carbon tax *(08-15)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Dependent Variable: Log of monthly per capita gasoline consumption
-0.00382*
-0.00312
-0.00227
-0.00382*
-0.00245
-0.00402**
(0.001448)
(0.001859)
(0.00153)
(0.001448)
(0.001249)
(0.0009282)
-0.00108
(0.0008576)

-0.00160
(0.001266)

-0.00174
(0.001237)

Carbon tax * (11-15)

-0.00108
(0.0008576)

-0.00158
(0.000894)

Carbon tax * (16-18)

0.00174
(0.0012367)
0.0000152***

0.0000143***

0.0000148***

0.0000152***

0.0000149***

0.0000148***

(0.0000021)

(0.0000016)

(0.0000017)

(0.0000021)

(0.0000017)

(0.0000017)

Price of gas

-0.00136*
(0.000508)

-0.00153*
(0.000512)

-0.00151*
(0.0005125)

-0.00153*
(0.0005125)

Gas taxes

-0.00335
(0.001886)

-0.00367
(0.002166)

-0.00377
(0.002169)

-0.00367
(0.002166)

Policies

-0.0734*
(0.032237)

GDP per capita

Business cycle controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-Year fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4.257***
(0.15004)
3167
0.525

4.254***
(0.15332)
3167
0.516

4.034***
(0.188725)
3263
0.509

4.258***
(0.15081)
3167
0.516

4.254***
(0.15332)
3167
0.516

4.034***
(0.18872)
N
3263
R2
0.509
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Constant
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APPENDIX C
Estimates of the effects of gasoline prices and carbon taxes on gasoline consumption (1991-2011)
(1)
Independent
Variables

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent Variable: Log of monthly per capita gasoline
consumption
-0.00735***
(0.00151)

-0.00687**
(0.00149)

-0.00757**
(0.00161)

-0.0122**
(0.00259)

0.00000916***
(0.00000156)

0.00000945***
(0.00000129)

0.00000924***
(0.00000124)

0.00000922***
(0.00000124)

Price of gas

-0.00163
(0.000886)

-0.00156
(0.000863)

-0.00157
(0.000867)

Gas taxes

-0.0000358
(0.00338)

-0.0000355
(0.00339)

-0.000172
(0.00341)

-0.0795*
(0.0273)

-0.0791*
(0.0274)

Carbon tax
GDP per capita

Polices

0.0952*
(0.0415)

Canada Line
Business
cycle controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Province-fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-Year
fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4.297***
(0.139)
2500

4.365***
(0.135)
2404

4.364***
(0.132)
2404

4.372***
(0.131)
2404

0.602

0.608

0.609

Constant
N

R2
0.599
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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APPENDIX D
Estimates of the effect of an amplified behavioral response to a carbon tax on gasoline consumption
(2003-2018)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Independent
Dependent: Variable: Log of monthly per capita gasoline consumption
Variable
Carbon tax
-0.00285
-0.00200
-0.00330*
-0.00233
(0.00117)
(0.000940)
(0.00124)
(0.000999)
-0.00249
(0.00102)

-0.00305*
(0.00117)

-0.00237
(0.00102)

-0.00295*
(0.00118)

GDP per capita

0.0000177**
(0.00000396)

0.0000185**
(0.00000337)

0.0000175**
(0.00000400)

0.0000183**
(0.00000349)

Price difference

-0.164
(0.104)

-0.132
(0.0913)

-0.0954
(0.114)

-0.0876
(0.105)

Border crossings

-7.19e-08
(7.75e-08)

-0.000000112
(8.40e-08)

8.15e-08
(0.000000105)

-9.15e-09
(0.000000108)

-0.000000330
(0.000000140)

-0.000000218
(0.000000147)

Carbon tax*(08-11)

Price difference*
Border crossings
Business cycle
controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

Province fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-Year fixed
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3.481***
(0.240)
1268
0.433

3.637***
(0.275)
1268
0.426

3.482***
(0.248)
1268
0.434

3.648***
(0.269)
N
1268
R2
0.424
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Constant
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APPENDIX E

Public Transit Ridership in Vancouver, British Columbia (1999-2018)
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